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INTRODUCTION

EASURED by its past, civil air transportation has made great
strides in providing safe, efficient and economic service in the
United States. A study of the present, however, provides no grounds
for complacency. It reveals the need for persistent efforts if the improved service possibilities of a technologically young industry are to
be realized in a dynamic market. Current analysis also discloses heavy
continued reliance on financial support by the public treasury for
some parts of the civil air transport system. While public financial
support is not necessarily undesirable, the present degree of dependence is viewed critically by transportation authorities and has become
a matter of concern for the Civil Aeronautics Board.
The Board itself has suggested that the civil air transport industry
can be strengthened and the public financial support reduced through
reshuffling the airlines' operating structures by consolidation and
mergers. In its Statement of Policy relating to the Economic Program
for 1949 it urged the industry to call ". . . to our attention uneconomic
route pattern situations and possible corrective actions which may be
' 'I
corrected by mergers, consolidations, interchanges or suspensions.
Later it proposed to study "The possibility, feasibility, and desirability
of bringing about the merger of air carriers where such mergers would
result in the improvement of the structure of the air transportation
map of this country, and would result in substantial public benefits
and lower mail rates." 2 While the agency has recently disapproved, at
President Eisenhower's direction, of Eastern Air Line's acquisition of
Colonial Airlines, it is unlikely that this will be the last development
in the attempt to strengthen the air route pattern by consolidating
airline facilities. In fact, steps have been taken to determine the public interest in the consolidation of other airline properties.3
1 Statement of Policy Respecting Economic Program of 1949, February 26,
1949.
2 Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 1950, p. 2.
8 The Board has instituted investigations to determine whether Lake Central
should be acquired by other airlines and whether Southwest and Bonanza should
be merged. Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 1953, pp. 3-4. Hearings were initiated in May on Pioneer's and Continental's proposal to consolidate
their facilities. The Board has initiated an investigation to determine the public
interest in integrating Braniff and Continental if the Pioneer-Continental pro-
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It is the purpose of this paper to describe and analyze regulatory
policy on mergers and acquisitions.s"
JURISDICTION OF THE

CAB

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gives jurisdiction over mergers
of domestic airlines to the Civil Aeronautics Board. 4 Where the proposed action involves an air carrier which is authorized to engage in
overseas or foreign
air transportation it is also subject to the approval
5
of the President.
In the event that the proposal for a consolidation of facilities necessitates the transfer of a certificate of convenience and necessity, section
401 (1) of the Act applies. This section requires Board approval for a
transfer. The agency is directed not to approve the transfer unless it is
consistent with the public interest.
Section 408 invokes the jurisdiction of the Board where a consolidation or merger is involved. The appropriate provisions of the section read as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful unless approved by order of the Authority (Board] as provided in this section(1) For two or more air carriers, or for any air carrier and any
other common carrier or any person engaged in any other phase
of aeronautics, to consolidate or merge their properties, or any
part thereof, into one person for the ownership, management, or
operation of the properties theretofore in separate ownerships;
(5) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier, any
other common carrier, or any person engaged in any other phase
of aeronautics, to acquire control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever;
Section 408 (b) requires the Board to give approval unless the proposed
action is inconsistent with the public interest. Although the directives
in Sections 401 and 408 are worded differently, the Board has held
they are synonymous in their intent. The public interest is the important consideration and the proposal must contribute to the realization
of this objective.8
Congress has laid down the broad principle that the Board be
guided in its actions by the public interest. In an attempt to partially
posal is not in the public interest. Order Serial No. E-7977 (1953).

The CAB

delayed its decision in the Reopened New York-Balboa Through Service Proceed-

ing, Order Serial No. E-8189 (1954), and has urged the carriers involved to
explore the possibilities of creating one line to service Pangra's and Braniff's
present international routes.
3a For earlier articles relating to this subject see Bluestone, "The Problem
of Competition Among Domestic Trunk Airlines," 20 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM.
379, and 21 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. 50; Anderson, "Airline Self-Sufficiency and
the Local Air Service Problem," 21 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. 1; Goodrick, "Air
Route Problem in the United States," 18 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. 281; and

Whitehead, "Effects of Competition and Changes in Route Structure on Growth
of Domestic Air Travel," 18 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. 78.

4 52 STAT. 987, 1001, 49 U.S.C. 481, 488.

552 STAT. 1014; 49 U.S.C. 601.

6 Acquisition of Mayflower by Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 680, 681 (1944);

Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, Initial Decision of the Examiner, Docket
No. 5546 (1952).
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interpret this general concept it stated in section 408 (b) that a merger
proposal shall not be approved if it would result in the creation of a
monopoly which would restrain competition or jeopardize another
carrier. Although not expressly referring to the question of mergers
or acquisitions of control, section 2 of the Act provides additional
statutory standards which the Board is to consider in determining the
public interest. These include 1) the encouragement of an air transportation system adapted to the present and future needs of commerce,
the postal service and national defense, 2) the preservation of the advantages of air transportation, the promotion of safety and sound
economic conditions in such transportation, and the improvement of
relations between, and coordination of transport by, air carriers, 3) the
promotion of adequate, economical and efficient services at reasonable
and nondiscriminatory charges and absent unfair and destructive competition, 4) the achievement of competition to the degree necessary to
assure a sound air transportation system, and 5) the development of air
commerce.
All of these, however, give no more than general direction to the
Board's deliberation. It remains with the agency to exercise discretion
in the individual cases before it within the framework of these broad
statutory principles. It is also within the agency's province as stated
in section 408 (b) to attach such terms and conditions to a proposed
merger as it finds just and reasonable.
PUBLIC INTEREST

A review of its decisions in merger, consolidation and transfer cases
reveals the specific factors which the Board has considered in determining the public interest in such actions. These factors are whether
1) the proposal will result in an integrated, rational and economical
route pattern, 2) it will suppress competition and injure another air
carrier, 3) the transfer price is satisfactory, and 4) the interests of labor
are protected.
Integrated, Rational and Economical Route Patterns
There is public interest in a proposed merger if it will result in an
integrated, rational and economical route pattern which will produce
improved services and economies of operation. Improved service is
anticipated if the merger creates the possibilities of through, onecarrier flights in lieu of two-carrier, connecting schedules. Historical
inter-line traffic, the traffic exchanged by two lines, is studied to determine the extent to which passengers would be convenienced by
one-carrier, improved service. If the inter-line traffic is substantial it is
assumed there will be a significant value to the traveling public in the
establishment of a consolidated company and the elimination of the
need to exchange passengers. At the same time, it is also assumed that
because of this convenience to passengers, traffic will increase to the
extent that revenues of the surviving carrier will be improved.
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The possibilities of achieving economies by consolidating the facilities of two airlines are also explored in determining the public interest
in a proposed merger. Savings may result as facilities and personnel
are jointly used and as direct operating economies result from more
rational route structures. If the surviving carrier is strengthened financially by increased revenues or more economical performance the
public interest is advanced. If the airlines are being subsidized the
mail pay need may be lessened.
The Board approved United Air Lines' acquisition of Western's
route No. 68 (Denver to Los Angeles) when it found the proposal would
result in an integrated and rational route pattern which would promote the public interest.7 The finding was based on the record which
showed a large number of passengers traveling between points on
United's route east of Denver and Los Angeles, on Western's route,
via the two systems with the passenger exchange effected at Denver.
The Board referred to route No. 68 as a segment in the great circle
transcontinental route from New York to Los Angeles. The passenger
traffic over this route would be convenienced by the establishment of
one-carrier service in lieu of the existing two-carrier service of United
and Western.
The dynamic nature of the advantage of integration, and the
Board's adjustment of its policy to changed conditions, can be seen
from an examination of the background of the above case. In 1940
the agency prevented United's direct entrance into Los Angeles (the
feat accomplished in the 1947 case) by rejecting a request to approve
that carrier's acquisition of Western.' In 1944 United's bid for direct
entry into Los Angeles was again rejected when Route No. 68 was certificated but was granted to Western rather than United. 9 In both the
1940 and 1944 decisions the agency acknowledged the strong possibilities of creating an integrated and rational route by permitting United
to provide through service from points on its system east of Denver to
Los Angeles. This consideration was not strong enough, however, to
overcome the public interest in maintaining Western as a strong regional carrier which would be seriously damaged by granting United
direct access to the south California city.
Whereas the protection of Western had been the principal factor
in the 1940 and 1944 cases, technological developments had changed
the weight of the considerations involved by 1947 and route integration had become of greater importance.10 While two-carrier, DC-3
connecting service between the East and Los Angeles was adequate and,
in fact, made Western's connecting service one of the strongest segments of its system in the early 1940's, the advent of new post-war air7 United-Western, Acquisition of Air CarrierProperty, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947).
8 United-Western, Interchange of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723, (1940); United-

Acquisition of Western, 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940). In 1940 the entry of United into
Los Angeles would have been achieved via Salt Lake City.
9 Western, Denver-Los Angeles Service, 6 C.A.B. 199 (1944). The examiner
had recommended United for this route.
10 It is probable that Western's financial straits carried considerable weight
with the Board in its 1947 decision. Note 38 infra.
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craft had increased the value of one-carrier, through service by 1947.
That is, nonstop flights utilizing the new equipment from Chicago and
the East to the West Coast decreased the value of the connecting service and enhanced the public interest in one-carrier operations. In other
words, technological developments had reduced the value to Western
of Route No. 68 as through service became feasible. While the public
interest in maintaining Western as a strong regional carrier continued,
its retention of Route No. 68 would no longer make the same relative
contribution to that end.
National's acquisition of Carribean-Atlantic failed to secure Board
approval in 1946. It was pointed out that there was no possibility of
physical fusion of the two systems which were separated by 1,000 miles
of ocean and which served two different territories. This condition
would prevent the realization of any significant economies of operation.
It was also unlikely that a normal flow of traffic would be convenienced
by the merging of two such physically non-integrated systems."
The CAB denied American's request for approval of its proposal
to acquire Mid-Continent. It was stated that the two systems it was
proposed to merge were non-complementary and that therefore amalgamation would not contribute to a well coordinated air network. The
tests applied were the amount of traffic which the two lines had exchanged in the past and the volume of traffic which moved between
points on the two systems and which would be convenienced by one
carrier service. While Mid-Continent did exchange much traffic with
2
other lines, the exchange with American was relatively small.'
A proposed merger of Braniff and Mid-Continent was approved in
1952, however. The interline traffic of the two systems which would
be provided one carrier service under the proposal was an important
consideration in the decision. This improvement in air travel facilities, it was thought, would stimulate traffic and thus increase commercial revenues. This, together with the savings in ground and indirect
operations which were expected from the elimination of duplicate
facilities, should reduce the mail pay needs of the merged carriers.'
Improvement which may occur in the service is not the only consideration in finding that an integrated, rational and economical route
pattern will result from merging two systems. On numerous occasions
the Board has pointed out that the action may cause substantial economies. When approval was given for the consolidation of Monarch and
Challenger in 1949 it was indicated that the economies of the combined
operations would be of even greater public interest than would the
expedited traffic flow. Savings in both indirect and direct expenses
were anticipated. Indirect accounts of the consolidated company would
11 National-Carribean-AtlanticControl Case, 6 C.A.B. 671 (1946).

12 American Airlines, Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, 7
C.A.B. 365 (1946).
' Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, Initial Decision of the Examiner,
Docket No. 5376 (1952). See also Acquisition of Mayflower by Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 680 (1944); Northern Consolidated Airlines, Consolidation, 8
C.A.B. 110 (1947); Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, Initial Decision of
the Examiner, Docket No. 5546 (1952).
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reflect the joint use of personnel and facilities. Direct accounts would
benefit as dead ends, formerly existing for both companies at Denver
and Salt Lake City, were eliminated and the more efficient use of persons and equipment was possible. The Board believed the mail pay
be reduced as a result of the
requirement of the operations would
4
economies which were anticipated.1
When the Delta-Chicago & Southern merger was approved it was
expected that the action would permit a more efficient utilization of
equipment. It was thought probable that additional service could be
offered without any increase in the number of aircraft because of improved use which could be made of existing planes. Again there was
reduction in mail pay requirements as a result
reference to an expected
15
of these economies.
Approval of American Airlines' acquisition of American Export
Airlines was granted when it was thought integration of the two systems would produce economies which would contribute to the strength
of the international carrier. Uniting the operating organizations and
experience and the traffic generating facilities of American in the
United States and the experience and organization of American Export in international service would permit the exploitation of the combined strength of the two companies. The CAB believed the result
would be substantial economies of operation, maintenance, sales and
generation and the promotion of
advertising, more effective traffic
16
international air transportation.
Although savings in mail subsidy were expected as a result of economies of operation, the President, under section 801, directed the Board
to disapprove Eastern's acquisition of Colonial. The Board had determined that Eastern had unlawfully acquired control of Colonial,
but had recommended approval of the merger on the basis of expected
economies. The President recognized the possibilities of achieving a
better integrated and more rational and economical route structure,17
but stated that these ends should not be achieved by unlawful means.
While convenience to the traveling public and economies of operation have been major considerations in determining whether a proposed acquisition will result in an integrated, rational and economic
route pattern, there have been other factors which have influenced
the Board's decisions. On several occasions it was pointed out that a
proposal would probably strengthen the remaining carrier financially.
Retention of Route No. 68 by Western would cause a further deterioration of the financial position of an already weak carrier. On the other
14Monarch-ChallengerMerger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33 (1949).

15 Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, Initial Decision of the Examiner,
Docket No. 5546 (1952). See also Northern Consolidated Airlines, Consolidation,
8 C.A.B. 110 (1947); Wien Alaska Air-Acquisition, Mirow Air, 3 C.A.B. 207
(1941).
16 American Airlines, Control of American Export Airlines, 6 C.A.B. 371
(1945); Northeast Airlines, North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319 (1945).
17 Eatern-Colonial,Acquisition of Assets, Order Serial No. E-8136 (1954).
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hand, relinquishing its role in the transcontinental market would
strengthen Western as a regional operator.'
The probability of improved management was given as an important consideration leading to the approval of Western's acquisition of
Inland. There was little likelihood of substantial traffic interchange
between the two systems. But the Board thought there was evidence
that in the past Inland's operations procedure and maintenance as well
as its 6perating personnel had not measured up to the standards which
the public interest required. Further, there appeared reason to believe
that Inland's management had been at least partially responsible for
the carrier's financial difficulties. Western's acquisition of Inland would
extend the benefits of its superior management, financial policy and
its higher standards of operation to the acquired carrier.19
Suppression of Competition to the Injury of Another Air Carrier
The Act requires disapproval of a proposed merger if it would
create a monopoly and "thereby restrain competition or jeopardize
another air carrier." However, the Board has never interpreted the
Act to require uncontrolled competition. To the contrary, its decisions
indicate it has pursued a policy of controlled competition. By means
of its certification powers it has restricted entry into the field of air
transport. By its regulation of services it restrains competition among
the existing companies. It appears that the agency has interpreted
the Act to require the prevention of 1) uncontrolled competition which
would jeopardize another company, and 2) "undesirable" domination
of air commerce by a carrier. This was clearly stated when the Board
said,
The question of the effect that the transfer of a certificate will
have on existing carriers has been and will continue to be an important issue in transfer cases and where the facts establish that
the competitive
approval of the agreement would unduly disturb
20
balance the agreement will be disapproved.
In those cases in which mergers were approved the Board has usually indicated that the diversionary impact of the consolidated company
on other carriers would not be of serious proportions. Improved service, economies of operation and strengthened carriers were given as
justification for the mergers. These developments were anticipated
as a result of improved traffic facilities. They were not expected as a
consequence of the elimination of competition. A merger was not permitted if it would provide uneconomic competition and weaken other
carriers. It was not approved if the result would be undesirable domination of air transport by one company.
American was not allowed to acquire Mid-Continent. Not only
18 United-Western, Acquisition of Air CarrierProperty, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947).
See also Northern Consolidated Airlines, Consolidation, 8 C.A.B. 110 (1947).
19 Western Air Lines, Acquisition of Inland Air Lines, 4 C.A.B. 654 (1944).
See also Wien Alaska Air-Acquisition, Mirow Air, 3 C.A.B. 207 (1941).
20 Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-7052, p. 8
(1952).
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were the two systems uncomplementary, but the proposal would have
a deleterious effect on competition. American was already the largest
domestic carrier. The acquisition of Mid-Continent would increase
its size. Furthermore, American would acquire a competitive advantage in connecting traffic. Whereas, at the present Mid-Continent's
interline traffic was exchanged largely with other carriers because of
greater convenience, the proposed consolidation would permit American to control this traffic, routing it over its own lines, to the disadvan21
tage of other companies.
Alaska Airlines, largest carrier in Alaska, was not permitted to acquire Cordova. Its acquisition would have given Alaska an overwhelming competitive advantage over the remaining Alaskan lines. This
would have precluded, it was thought, the development of the balanced
22
competition which the public interest required.
Potentially uneconomic competition was the consideration when a
proposal to unify Southwest and West Coast, two local service lines
operating on the Pacific Coast, was rejected. Trunk lines flying in the
area had expressed a strong distaste for the proposal on the grounds
it would divert traffic from them. The agency found ample justifica23
tion for these fears and refused its approval for the move.
Other local service lines were permitted to merge notwithstanding
the fears of the trunk lines. In these cases the Board thought trunk
line traffic would not be diverted but would continue to move as it
had in the past because of the established position of the major lines.
The local lines were required to stop at intermediate points, while the
trunk lines could offer faster service by minimizing their stops.
Furthermore, the major airlines had greater advertising, stronger sales
facilities and superior equipment. In other words, the local service
lines were expected to remain fundamentally local lines while the
trunk lines would continue to carry the trunk line traffic. 2'
PurchasePrice

The price at which it is proposed to transfer assets has been an additional consideration in airline merger cases. Terms of the agreement
must be reasonable and must not impair the capacity of the acquiring
company to provide efficient service. The Board has maintained that
reasonableness of purchase price depends not only upon the ability of
the purchaser to pay the price, but also upon the value of the property
to be acquired. The agency must be satisfied that the carriers' financial
condition will permit it to meet the terms of the proposal. It must
21 American Airlines, Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, 7
C.A.B.
22 365 (1946).
Acquisition of Cordova by Alaska Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 708 (1944). See also
Alaska Air, Service to Anchorage, 3 C.A.B. 522 (1942). For decisions approving
mergers on the ground that the competitive balance would not be destroyed see
Marine Airways, Alaska Air Transport-Con8solidation,3 C.A.B. 315 (1942);
Wien2 5Alaska Air-Acquisition, Mirow Air, 3 C.A.B. 207 (1941).
Southwest-West Coast Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-5594 (1951).
24
Monarch-ChallengerMerger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33 (1949); Arizona-Monarch
Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246 (1950); West Coast Empire Merger Case, Order
Serial No. E-6550 (1952).
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also be convinced that the value of assets transferred has not been inflated to the extent that a weakened carrier will not be able to offer
efficient service without additional financial support from the government.
Braniff Airways' proposed acquisition of Aerovias Braniff was not
approved. The estimated plans for operation of Aerovias were inadequate, vague and indefinite. For this reason it was impossible to
ascertain the financial effects of the proposal on Braniff Airways. There
was a distinct possibility, indeed a probability, the new company would
prove to be a financial drain on Braniff Airways. This would impair
Braniff's ability to raise needed capital and endanger its capacity to
respond to the future needs of air transportation without prolonged
financial assistance in the form of public subsidy.2 5
Although the impossibility of achieving an integrated system was
an important consideration leading to disapproval of National's acquisition of Carribean-Atlantic, the Board was also influenced by what
it thought were the inequities of the purchase arrangement. The majority stockholder in Carribean-Atlantic was to receive 1 share of
National stock for 1.26 shares of his present stock. Minority stockholders were to receive only 1 share for 5 shares of Carribean-Atlantic.
The CAB was not satisfied with the proceedings which had led to this
arrangement and stated that such apparent inequities would inevitably
26
have an adverse effect on airline investments.
It has been the Board's policy in acquisition cases to distinguish
between two sets of values-market value for transfer purposes and
book value for rate-making purposes. It has generally insisted that
value for rate-making not be increased as a result of consolidations.
The Board said,
We are . . . of the opinion that for rate-making purposes the
proper valuation . . . should be related to the original cost . . .
less allowable depreciation rather than to the fair market value.
27

The agency has permitted, however, assets to be transferred at prices
which exceed book value. It has reasoned that profits realized from
such transactions will induce a seller to dispose of its properties to
another carrier in a position to operate them with greater advantage
to the public. In the absence of this incentive one of two alternatives
would result, it is said. First, the air network would be frozen. Secondly, the Board could pressure the carriers by its airmail or certificate
suspension powers into redrawing the network. This it has been reluctant to do, concluding it has no power to achieve indirectly what it has
no power to accomplish directly-requiring the carriers to transfer
their property.
A market value above book value is reached by a write-up of tan25 Braniff Airways, Acquisition of Aerovias Braniff, 6 C.A.B. 947 (1946).
26National-Carribean-AtlanticControl Case, 6 C.A.B. 671 (1946).
27 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298, 312
(1947).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

gible assets and by the inclusion of intangibles. Justification for a
write-up is found where market conditions have caused the value of
the assets to exceed their original cost less depreciation or where the
assets will have greater value in the hands of the acquiring carrier than
they would in other uses.2" The inclusion of intangibles, including
goodwill and going concern value, is permitted on the grounds that an
improvement in the earning power of the acquiring carrier will follow
from the transfer and, thus, warrants this action.29
The Board is inclined to accept an exchange price above book value
where it has been arrived at as a result of arms-length bargaining (no
compulsion being involved) by two parties represented by competent
and able individuals who are experienced in business and cognizant
of the problems of air transportation. The alternative to this, if the
transfer is permitted above book value, would require the Board itself
to accept the responsibility of fixing the price. The agency has considered this ".

.

. not only contrary to the intent of the Act, but outside

the competence of the Board." 0
Adherence to this policy has raised the problem of preventing a
market value in excess of book value from becoming a part of the latter. In the United-Western case the Board attempted to achieve this
by requiring that the excess be charged to surplus.8 In the MonarchChallenger case the payment was made between individuals and was
not reflected in the accounts of the carriers.8 2 In the more recent
Braniff-Mid-Continent and Delta-Chicago c Southern cases the exchanges were effectuated by transfers of securities with no change in
the book values of the assets. 88
Although it has accepted exchange prices above the recorded values
of the assets this policy of the Board has been vigorously challenged.
Chairman James M. Landis in a strong dissent stated his belief that the
excess would necessarily affect rates paid by the consumer or the government, even though charged to surplus and not entered in the rate
base. Landis argued the credit position of the acquiring carrier would
be weakened as the stockholders' claims, represented by the surplus
account, were dissipated. Increased rates either on mail or commercial
8
traffic would necessarily be required to avoid this. '

The same reasoning could be applied to the recent cases in which
28 Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, Initial Decision of the Examiner,
Docket No. 5546 (1952); Acquisition of Mayflower by Northeast Airlines, 4
C.A.B. 680 (1944).
29 United-Western, Acquisition of Air CarrierProperty,8 C.A.B. 298 (1947).

80 Ibid., p.
81 Ibid., p.
32

314.
318.

Monarch-Challenger Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33 (1949).

33Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-6459 (1952);

Delta-Chicago& Southern Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-7052 (1952).
34 United-Western, Acquisition of Air CarrierProperty,8 C.A.B. 298, 325-345
(1947). On an earlier occasion Board member Edward Warner objected to the
assignment of an exchange value to a certificate Marquette Airlines proposed to

transfer to TWA. Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, Supplemental Opinions,

2 C.A.B. 409 (1940). The decision in this case was interesting in that it represented a clear-cut reversal of an earlier opinion in which the Board had stated
that the inclusion of a value for a certificate above its developmental costs was
not in the public interest. Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 1 (1940).
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mergers have been effectuated by an exchange of securities. On these
occasions the rates at which the securities of two carriers were exchanged reflected the excess of transfer price over recorded value.
Thus, Chicago &:Southern shareholders were to be given $10,000,000
Delta debentures for assets with a book value of $7,000,000.8 5 MidContinent stockholders were offered Braniff stock at a ratio of 1 share
of Braniff to 1.5 shares of Mid-Continent. A comparison of book values revealed a ratio of approximately 1 to 1.72.36

Has this policy of the Board resulted in increased rates as Landis
feared? An examination of the record does not provide a definitive
answer, but some general observations are in order. Mail rates for the
airlines industry were raised in 1948, following United's acquisition
of Route No. 68 at a price above book value. The Board, however, has
declared these increases were necessitated by an overexpansion of the
industry induced by over-optimism in the immediate post-war period.37
If uniform mail and commercial rates are applied to a group of
carriers, as the Big 4, it is impossible to assert that an equal increase
for all is a result of the dissipation of the shareholders' equity in one
company. It would appear that where these uniform rates exist, and
where no special action favoring a particular company is taken, the
impact of such a charge to surplus will be on the stockholders, not on
the shippers and public treasury. If the acquisition of assets improves
the earning capacity of the company the shareholders will benefit,
partially or wholly offsetting the excess of price above book value. If
the earning capacity is worsened, the shareholders will lose. The ability
to continue to meet the increasing capital needs in an industry characterized by rapid growth without special government financial support
indicates no calamitous impairment of the stockholders' equity.
Furthermore, as long as the CAB pursues the policy of applying
uniform rates to a group of carriers, it is academic to pursue the notion
that an improved earning position from a route adjustment should be
reflected in lower rates for the particular airline. Industry competition
requires that charges for similar commercial services must be practically
uniform. Uniform mail rates are sound regulatory policy where they
are service (nonsubsidy) rates.
If the danger of increased costs to shippers or the public is not
present it would appear the policy of permitting an exchange price in
excess of book value is justified. This leaves the initiative for recasting
the air network with the airlines where, under the present philosophy
of negative regulation or "umpiring," it was probably intended it
should be. An incentive is provided for an airline to dispose of its
routes, or segments of routes, to carriers willing to pay the price because of the greater earning value which the property will have for the
acquiring company. The Board correctly expects the profit incentive
35

Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, Initial Decision of the Examiner,
Docket6 No. 5546 (1952).
s Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-6459 (1952).
87 Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 1948, p. 12.
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will provide a more reliable standard, under its supervision, for modifying the network in the public interest than would the standards it
might apply.8"
Acceptance of this principle, however, provides no argument for
permitting an exchange price based on speculation in the subsidy
value of airline property. Since consolidation is viewed as a method of
strengthening the commercial air transport industry, it is probable
that at least some actions will involve the weaker airlines, those presently being supported by the government. If airline assets requiring
subsidy are involved, the payment of a price in excess of the book value
of the assets is based solely on speculation on the CAB's mail pay policy. This undesirable development could be avoided by the adoption
of a clearly defined policy eliminating the subsidy element in mail pay.
If this were done, an exchange price above net book value could be
based only on the commercial value to the acquiring company of the
route or route segment to be acquired.
It is presumed here, however, that the public interest may require
the government to support certain airline operations, e.g., those of
some international carriers. When the properties of these airlines are
involved in a merger proposal an intangible value, assignable to the
certificate of convenience and necessity, will appear if the total income
is capitalized. It appears impossible to prevent this, assuming permanent certification of the route, under present legislation which circumscribes the authority of the CAB to revoke certificate rights. In
these circumstances, however, the intangible value could be minimized
if the Board would provide only the minimum support required to
maintain the essential operations. This support should be so limited
as to provide an incentive for the present company to dispose of its
properties to a carrier if this carrier could operate a better integrated,
more rational and economic route structure, one which could be maintained profitably at the rate of minimum financial support provided.
Although the Board generally prohibits an inflation of the rate
base, a write-up in the investment for rate-making purposes occurred
when West Coast acquired Empire. Under the terms of the proposed
arrangement the price of $525,000, claimed as the fair market value of
the assets, was $338,000 in excess of the book value, $187,000, of Empire's properties. The Board's decision approving the merger required
that this fair market value be reduced by the amount of depreciation
for which Empire had already been reimbursed in mail payments.
However, a write-up of the undepreciated assets was permitted. This
had the effect of increasing the net book value for rate-making purposes by approximately $106,000.89
38 It is not implied that the Board accepts this standard solely on grounds
of principle. The atmosphere in which the agency approved an intangible exchange value of Western's Route 68 is a case in point. The financial position of
Western was weak. "Board approval of the transfer was a condition precedent
to an RFC loan .... " Edward C. Sweeney, "Staff Report on the Civil Aeronautics
Board," included in Air-Line Industry Investigation, 81st Cong., 1st and 2nd
Sess., p. 2218. See also pp. 2329-2331.
89 West Coast-Empire Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-6550 (1952).
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In approving the write-up the Board recognized that this represented a departure from its policy of insisting that investment for
determining rates not be increased by consolidations. Reference was
made to the "special circumstances" in this case, and a warning was
issued that this was not to be accepted as a precedent for. future cases.
The "special circumstances" resulted from the difficulties with which
negotiations had proceeded (several earlier attempts had failed) after
the Board itself had urged that the possibilities of a West Coast-Empire
merger be explored. In an admitted effort to induce the two parties
to accept the final plan, Empire was permitted a profit and West Coast
was allowed to increase the investment base by the write-up.
This deviation from accepted policy did not go unchallenged, however. Vice Chairman Oswald Ryan pointed out the inconsistency of
the action when judged by past decisions and stated the opinion might
have broad significance for future consolidation cases. Ryan said:
This is a compromise of principle which is likely to have a profound effect on all mergers and acquisitions in the future. It can
become the entering wedge by which the existing assets of numerous companies cn be inflated, the return to stockholders substantially increased, and 40the cost to the government, and ultimately
the consumer raised.
It is possible that the action in this case may prove to be only a
transitory lapse from a policy of preventing any inflation of the rate
based by merger. The Board itself betokened this at the time it set
the mail rate for the merged company. It confirmed its acceptance of
the write-up, but in doing so said,
... we do so with the explicit reservation that absent the special
circumstances present here, we will continue to apply the general
principle ... that equipment ordinarily .

.

. shall be recorded for

rate purposes on the basis
of the net book value as shown on the
41
books of the transferor.
Protective Labor Conditions
Consolidating the facilities of two airlines may affect the interests
of several groups. Reference has already been made to the possibilities
of convenience to the traveling public, through improved travel facilities, and benefit to the government and investors, as a result of greater
earning potential. Employees may be adversely affected by the termination of employment or the transfer to positions of less remuneration through displacement by a senior employee. That labor has been
aware of this is evidenced by its requests that provisions designed to
protect its interests be included when the Board approves a merger.
There is no express statutory authority for imposing such provisions. Implicit power, however, exists in section 408 (b) which permits the imposition of such terms and conditions as are in the public
interest. In recent cases the CAB has found the public interest requires
40 Ibid. pp. 1-2 of the dissenting opinion.
41 West Coast Airlines, Mail Rates, Order Serial No. E-7412, pp. 7-8 (1953).
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that benefits for the traveling public, the stockholders and the government should not be achieved at the expense of the employees. Furthermore, it is thought the national interest is protected if labor difficulties
arising out of hardships incident to a merger are not allowed to become
the basis for delaying or preventing the unification of facilities for the
interruption of service. 42 The Board has found support for this position not only in other regulatory legislation, 4 but also in judicial
decisions upholding the legislation. 44 As a result, the agency has endeavored in recent years to anticipate the labor problems which may
arise when airlines merge and has taken steps to provide for their
amicable settlement.
In the earlier cases the Board refused to attach protective labor
conditions to its approval of mergers notwithstanding the Air Line
Pilots Association's requests for action of this type. This position was
taken on the grounds that the interests of labor appeared adequately
protected without intervention. In 1947 when United was permitted
to acquire Western's Route No. 68 this policy was continued. Western
had testified that on the basis of its expansion plans none of its employees would be unfavorably affected. 45 These optimistic expectations of Western were not realized, however. An appeal by various
labor groups induced the Board in 1950 to reexamine its policy of noninterference and retroactively to require provisions for the employees'
4
protection.
In this 1950 case there was no precedent in air transport regulation
to guide the Board. Consequently, while it provided a plan to meet
the specific problems presently before it, it was unwilling to adopt a
general formula for future cases. It turned for guidance to the field
of railroad regulation and the Burlington Formula applied by the
I. C. C. in 1944. 4 1 The Board strongly urged airline labor and man42 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701
(1950); North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 124 (1950).
48 The TransportationAct of 1940, 54 STAT. 905; The Communications Act,
57 STAT. 5.
44 U.S. v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939); I.C.C. v. Railway Labor Assn., 315

U.S. 373 (1942); Railway Labor Assn. v. U.S. 339 U.S. 142 (1950).

45 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8
(1947); see also Western Air, Acquisition of Inland Air, 4 C.A.B.
American Airlines, Control of American Export Airlines, 6 C.A.B.
Monarch-Challenger Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33 (1949).
46 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11

(1950).

C.A.B. 298
654 (1944);
371 (1945);
C.A.B. 701

47 The Burlington Formula, applied in a railroad abandonment case, contained the following conditions: 1) an employee placed in a worse position with
respect to compensation and working conditions should be paid a monthly displacement allowance equal to the difference between his current employment
and that from which he was displaced; 2) a monthly allowance equal to the
average monthly pay of his prior employment should be paid an employee who
was dismissed; 3) an employee affected by the abandonment should not be deprived of the fringe benefits attached to his prior employment; 4) moving
expenses were to be paid to an employee who was required to move as a result
of the abandonment; 5) an employee should be reimbursed for the loss from a
sale of his house at less than fair value or the termination of a lease when the
loss resulted from a required change in the location of employment; and 6) any
dispute arising out of the interpretation of the formula was to be submitted
to arbitration. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Abandonment, 257 I.C.C. 700
(1944).

RECASTING AIR ROUTE PATTERN

agement to follow the example set in the railroad industry and to work
out a general program to mitigate the hardships to labor incident to
mergers.
In the absence of successful collective bargaining in the UnitedWestern case, conditions providing for compensation for employees'
losses of the following type were imposed: 1) loss of salary attributable
to furlough or termination of employment, 2) loss of salary resulting
from transfer to a position of lower pay, and 3) moving and transportation expenses incident to a transfer to a new location. If the carrier
(Western) and employees were unable to arrive at a satisfactory agreement regarding the problems of compensation, arbitration was to be
employed. The jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal was to include
not only the question of which employees were adversely affected, but
also the questions of what compensation should be paid these employees and the period of time for which compensation should be
48
granted.
The integration of seniority lists has posed a particularly thorny
problem in airline mergers. The serious nature of the question became evident when Pan American was permitted to acquire American
Overseas Airlines. Although the order approving the merger had specifically required arbitration in the event of failure to successfully
negotiate an agreement, 49 four groups of Pan American employees
refused either to negotiate or to arbitrate until an order stipulated
an agreement must be reached or the Board itself would integrate the
employee lists.50 Even this failed to conclude the dispute between
several labor groups. Pan American pilots challenged the jurisdiction
and questioned the procedure of an arbitration tribunal to which they
had been a party but which had produced an award to which they
objected. The questions were carried to the court where the award
was upheld. 91 Pan American flight engineers refused not only to negotiate and submit to arbitration, but denied the authority of the Board
also was carried to the
to integrate the seniority lists. This question
52
court where the CAB's decision was affirmed.
In 1952 the Braniff-Mid-Continent opinion produced what may
prove to be a general formula for protecting employees adversely affected by airline mergers. The Board stated carefully that its decision
was not to be considered as a prejudgment of future cases; each would
be decided in the light of conditions peculiar to it. Nevertheless, since
its adoption the Braniff-Mid-Continent formula has been applied,
with modifications to fit the circumstances, on the three occasions that
mergers have been approved. The main clauses of the formula provide
for, 1) the integration of seniority lists, 2) the payment of displace48 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 11 C.A.B. 701
(1950). The court upheld the Board's power to retrocatively impose protective
labor conditions in this case. Western Air v. C.A.B., 194 F. 2d. 211 (1952).
49 North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 124 (1950).
80 North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 12 C.A.B. 422 (1951).
51 O'Donnell v. Pan American, 200 F. 2d. 929 (1953).
52
Kent v. C.A.B., 204 F. 2d. 263 (1953).
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ment allowances, 3) the payment of dismissal allowances, and 4) compensation for loss and expenses incident to changing locations.5"
The Board prefers that seniority lists be integrated by negotiation
between the parties concerned. In its original United-Western decision
it had expected that negotiated settlements of this and other problems
would be reached. 54 Since this expectation was not fulfilled and since
it had to impose retroactively protective labor conditions, the Board
has been unwilling to restrict itself to urging an amicable settlement
of problems and then confine itself to retaining jurisdiction until satisfactory solutions are reached. The Braniff-Mid-Continent formula
requires that arbitration be used when negotiation breaks down.
The Board's preference for negotiation followed by arbitration was
spelled out clearly when it approved the merger of Flying Tiger and
'Slick. Slick pilots had opposed on legal grounds the provision for arbitration, and had favored a Board order integrating the seniority lists,
if negotiations failed. The agency said,
We find no reason to depart from our view that seniority disputes
arising from airline mergers are best settled by negotiated agreement, and that the other methods - arbitration, integration by
Board action, and leaving the dispute to be resolved by economic
pressure - descend in desirability in the order stated. 55
In refusing to accept responsibility for performing the task, the
Board referred to the prolonged proceedings, involving both arbitration and adjudication, which followed its efforts when Pan American
acquired American Overseas Airlines.
Although it refused to require arbitration of all questions of assignment of personnel in the Braniff-Mid-Continent formula, the Board
reversed this policy when Delta acquired Chicago & Southern. On that
occasion Delta employees, excepting the pilots, were unorganized. To
provide this group additional protection, arbitration was required if
there was no agreement reached on "rearrangement" of employees. 5
The Braniff-Mid-Continent formula provides that displacement
allowances be paid employees who are placed in positions offering
lower compensation than the employees received prior to the merger.
The claim for this allowance must be presented within three years of
the effective date of the merger. The protection is afforded for a period
of four years. 57
53 Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-6459 (1952).
The three later cases in which the formula was applied are West Coast Empire
Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-6550 (1952); Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-7052 (1952); Flying Tiger-Slick Merger Case,
Order Serial No. E-8022 (1954).
54 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298
(1947).
55 Flying Tiger-Slick Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-8022, p. 6 (1954).
56 Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-7052 (1952).
57 The Delta-Chicago & Southern case appeared at first glance to produce

a modification of the formula when the Board stated that employees who refused
to change their residence should not be provided the protection of displacement
allowances. Mr. Jay M. Jackson, Legal Counsel, Braniff Airways, Inc., has called

the author's attention to the fact that although its decision in the Braniff-MidContinent case did not specifically exclude personnel who refused to change their
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The formula provides that an employee deprived of employment
as a result of the merger shall be accorded a dismissal allowance equivalent to 60% of his average monthly pay for a period which varies with
the length of employment to a maximum of five years. The employee
may elect to take in lieu of a dismissal allowance a lump sum separation payment determined by the length of his employment and his
average monthly rate of pay. The company's liability, however, is
reduced by earnings which may be received from other employment.
Payment of travel and moving expenses for employees who are
required as a result of the merger to change their place of employment
is called for by the Braniff-Mid-Continent formula. If as a result of
the move the employee experiences a loss on the sale of his home, he
shall be reimbursed by the carrier for the loss. The loss for which
reimbursement is required is that which arises from a sale at less than
fair market value, i.e., it is a result of a "distress" sale.
In addition to the above protection provided employees adversely
affected by a merger, provisions of the Braniff-Mid-Continent formula
also require disputes arising in the administration of the protective
labor conditions to be resolved by arbitration. The Board specifically
stated its preference for this procedure in lieu of one which would
require a Board order for settlement. Employees earning in excess of
$6,500 per year, excepting flight personnel, dispatchers and meteorologists are excluded from the protection. In the Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case the carriers expressed a willingness to eliminate this
provision. This modification the Board accepted.58
SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSION

Two conditions point inevitably to the need for a survey of the
national air network with a view to the elimination of deficiencies
which may be discovered. First, the readily apparent existence of public financial support for some airlines clearly indicates a public stake
in the air route pattern. Secondly, the dynamic character of both the
air transport industry and the market in which it is offered indicates
an evolving public interest in air transportation facilities. The survey
may reveal inadequate routes. It may disclose uneconomic route patterns. These defects may be adjusted with public advantage by a
certification of additional routes."9 They may be adjusted by the elimination of existing routes or route segments under temporary certifiresidence from the protective conditions, the Board has followed this policy in
the administration of the formula. A group of persons who elected not to move
from Kansas City, where they had been employed by Mid-Continent, to Dallas,
where they were offered employment by Braniff, was denied the right to dismissal allowances. Frances L. Ashby, et al., v. Braniff, Order Serial No. E-7741
(1953).
58 Order Serial No. E-7052 (1952).
59 For a discussion of certification procedure see Howard C. Westwood,
"Choice of the Air Carrier for New Air Transport Routes," 16 George Washington Law Review 1 and 159 (1947 & 1948); Paul D. Zook, "The Certification
of Local and Feeder Air Carriers," 7 Southwestern Law Journal 185 (1953).
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cates. 60 Finally, they may be adjusted by consolidating the present
facilities of operating airlines.
The consolidation of airline properties is subject to the approval
of the CAB. The agency has granted or withheld its approval on the
basis of public interest in such action. Public interest is conceived to
be a function of several factors. First, the proposal should result in an
integrated, rational and economic route pattern. It will do this if it
will convenience the traveling public because of improved service, if it
will produce economies of operation with benefit to the stockholders
and with reduced cost to the government and, finally, if it will strengthen the carrier financially or provide it with improved management.
Secondly, the proposal should not result in uncontrolled competition
which would endanger another carrier, nor should it permit an undesirable domination of air commerce by one company. Thirdly, the
proposed transfer of assets must be on terms which neither impair the
ability of the acquiring line to provide efficient service nor create a
need for higher commercial or mail revenues by an inflation of the
rate base. Finally, the advantages to be gained by the traveling public,
the carrier and the government must not be at the expense of the
employees. For this reason the Board considers conditions designed to
protect the interests of labor to be in the public interest.
While consolidation proposals may originate either with the Board
or the airlines, those raised by the latter have been most productive
of results. The agency's investigation into the public interest in transferring National's routes and property to other carriers was dismissed
in 1951 after the company's financial condition had improved. 1 The
investigation into the public interest in a modification of the route
patterns of Western and Northeast came to nothing.6 2 In 1952 the
Board instituted an investigation into the public interest in mergers
or combinations of air carriers in the eastern part of the United States.
The procedural steps were indefinitely postponed, however, after an
investigation into the desirability of consolidating the facilities of
National and Colonial was undertaken. 3 The outcome was still pending following the rejection of an Eastern-Colonial Merger. 64 However,
60 The temporary certificates of three local service lines have not been renewed. Florida Airways, Certificate Extension, 10 C.A.B. 93 (1949); Mid-West
Certificate Renewal Case, Order Serial No. E-6311 (1952); Wiggins Renewal
Investigation, Order Serial No. E-6904 (1952). Local service routes have been
modified and route segments eliminated in the certificate renewal cases. Trunk
line service has been suspended under section 401 (h), sometimes at the request
of the carriers, sometimes over their objections. See Victor S. Netterville,
"Local Service Airlines: Trunkline Suspensions in Aid of the Local Service
Experiment," 26 Southern California Law Review 229 (1953). Netterville believes the Board's suspension power may be one of its most significant ones. He
sees its use as evidence of the agency's willingness to face-up to the problem
of an air route pattern which is not completely satisfactory.
61 National Airlines, Route Investigation, 12 C.A.B. 798 (1951).
62 Order Serial No. E-485 (1947) as amended by Order Serial No. E-2479
(1949); and Order Serial No. E-375 (1947) as amended by Order Serial No.
E-2478 (1949).
63 Eastern-Colonial,Acquisition of Assets, Docket No. 5666, Initial Decision
of the
64 Examiner (1953).
Eastern-Colonial,Acquisition of Assets, Order Serial No. E-8136 (1954).

RECASTING AIR ROUTE PATTERN

the Board's suggestion that West Coast and Empire explore the possibilities of combining their facilities did lead the two carriers to merge.6
Generally, it has been the position of the Board that it should not
formulate the plan for combining the facilities of two airlines. One
member has expressed doubt whether the agency has the authority to
require the airlines to conform to a plan even if the Board was inclined
to draw one. 8 Given this attitude of the Board, it would appear that
a recasting of the present route pattern by consolidation or merger
must await voluntary action by the airlines.
However, a study of railroad consolidation leads to the conclusion
that without strong incentives, reliance on voluntary action cannot be
expected to produce the desired results - the creation of an economically strong transportation system.6 7 Adequate incentive might be
found not in the highest, but in the most "steady" human motive, to
use Alfred Marshall's expression. In other words, voluntary airline
consolidation and merger can be expected not as a result of a public
interest in such action, but in response to the possibilities of an economic advantage for the parties to the consolidation. In the case of
non-subsidized carriers, the economic advantage must be found in the
improved earning position expected as a result of consolidation. In the
case of subsidized carriers, the Board's power over airmail payments
provides an opportunity to offer this economic advantage to the airlines.
It is suggested here that a CAB policy which is openly designed to
eliminate or reduce the subsidy element in airmail payments might
convince the weak airlines there is an economic advantage to be gained
in strengthening the air route pattern by consolidation and merger.
The airlines have less incentive for this, the advantage in doing so is
not as apparent, under the Board's policy of supporting the present
operating structure with mail pay. The agency has been reluctant to
pressure one airline into transferring its property to another by a
reduction of its mail pay. There should be no hesitation, however,
about adopting a general policy designed to achieve an orderly withdrawal of federal support. (The support should be reduced to a
minimum where, as in the case of international air transportation,
continued operations are clearly warranted on non-economic grounds.)
Such a program might induce the airlines to explore more actively
the possibilities for reshuffling the present commercial airline system
by consolidations and mergers. The Board is not legally bound to provide mail support for the existing structure of the industry. It is legally
bound to provide the mail payments required to sustain an air transportation system adapted to the present and future needs of commerce,
the postal service and national defense. It is legally required to foster
sound economic conditions in such an air transportation system.
65Southwest-West Coast Merger Case, Order Serial No. E-5594 (1951).
66 Russell B. Adams, "The Air Route Pattern Problem," 17 JOUR. AIR LAW &
CoM. 127 (1950).

67 Charles L. Dearing & Wilfred Owen, National Transportation Policy
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1949), pp. 316-347.

